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EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONIAL REDUCTIONISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  14 December 2012

William D. Rowley
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Abstract

An objection to reductionism in the epistemology of testimony that is often repeated but rarely defended in detail is that there is not enough positive evidence to provide the non-testimonial, positive reasons reductionism requires. Thus, on pain of testimonial skepticism, reductionism must be rejected. Call this argument the ‘Not Enough Evidence Objection’ (or ‘NEEO’). I will defend reductionism about testimonial evidence against the NEEO by arguing that we typically have non-testimonial positive reasons in the form of evidence about our testifier's evidence. With a higher-level evidence principle borrowed from recent work on the epistemology of disagreement, I argue that, granting some plausible assumptions about conversational norms, the NEEO is unsound.

Type
Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 9 , Issue 4 , December 2012 , pp. 377 - 391
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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