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Epistemic Subjectivism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 January 2012

Roger White
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Abstract

Epistemic subjectivism, as I am using the term, is a view in the same spirit as relativism, rooted in skepticism about the objectivity or universality of epistemic norms. I explore some ways that we might motivate subjectivism drawing from some common themes in analytic epistemology. Without diagnosing where the arguments go wrong, I argue that the resulting position is untenable.

Type
Research Article
Information
Episteme , Volume 4 , Issue 1 , February 2007 , pp. 115 - 129
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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