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COMMENTS ON “WHAT THE INTERNALIST SHOULD SAY TO THE TORTOISE”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2015

Sarah Wright
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Abstract

Richard Fumerton has provided two possible responses that the internalist might make to the “Tortoise problem.” I argue that the second of these two responses is preferable, and I suggest one way that it might be strengthened.

Type
Articles
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Episteme , Volume 12 , Special Issue 2: 10th Anniversary of Episteme , June 2015 , pp. 219 - 223
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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