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BEST EXPLANATIONISM AND JUSTIFICATION FOR BELIEFS ABOUT THE FUTURE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 April 2015

Gregory Stoutenburg
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Abstract

Earl Conee and Richard Feldman have recently argued that the evidential support relation should be understood in terms of explanatory coherence: roughly, one's evidence supports a proposition if and only if that proposition is part of the best available explanation of the evidence (2008). Their thesis has been criticized through alleged counterexamples, perhaps the most important of which are cases where a subject has a justified belief about the future (Byerly 2013; Byerly and Martin forthcoming). Kevin McCain has defended the thesis against Byerly's counterexample (2013, 2014a). I argue that McCain's defense is inadequate before pointing toward a more promising solution for explanationism. The Byerly–McCain exchange is important because it casts light on the difficult issues of the standards for justification and the nature of epistemic support. Furthermore, McCain's defense of explanationism about epistemic support represents an important recent development of the burgeoning explanationist program in epistemology and philosophy of science.

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Articles
Information
Episteme , Volume 12 , Issue 4 , December 2015 , pp. 429 - 437
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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