This article offers an account of the economics of the environment. I sketch the subject's motivation and scope, and try to identify what we know and what we don't as yet know about matters of concern. This demands brazen selection, and I haven't avoided it: for the most part, the article explores the interface of rural poverty and the environmental resource-base in poor countries. A contrast is drawn between geographically localized resources and the global commons. The role of property rights, both private and collective, and their implied resource allocation mechanisms are studied. Criteria for social cost–benefit analysis of projects and policies are derived, and their link with the concept of net national product is drawn.

I feel greatly honoured to have been invited to participate in the inaugural conference of Environment and Development Economics. I should like first of all to congratulate Karl-Göran Mäler, Partha Dasgupta and Charles Perrings on the inauguration of the new journal and wish it to be successful in opening an entire new vista in economics.

The paper analyses the conflict between wildlife conservation and its accompanying land-use in an East African context. In the model there are two agents. First, there is an agency managing the wildlife and the habitat of the wildlife, which is referred to as parkland. On the other hand, there is the group of agro-pastoralists living in the vicinity of the wildlife habitat, whose land-use is referred to as rangelands. The parkland is used for tourism production and hunting, while the rangelands are used for agro-pastoral production. Both agents will find it beneficial to expand their land-use, so there is a land-use conflict. This is analysed in two steps. First, social optimality is studied; then we study the utilization of the wildlife and its accompanying land-use when there is no unified resource policy and the park agency follows its self-interest. The effects on the two different management schemes of changing economic conditions, such as the recommendations of the CITES convention and a programme subsidizing agro-pastoral production, are discussed.

People in poor countries are for the most part agrarian and pastoral. In 1988 rural people accounted for about 65 per cent of the population of what the World Bank classifies as low-income countries. The proportion of the total labour force in agriculture was a bit in excess of this. The share of agriculture in gross domestic product in these countries was 30 per cent. These figures should be contrasted with those from industrial market economies, which are 6 per cent and 2 per cent for the latter two ratios, respectively.

This paper seeks to develop a basic analytical framework that can be used to trace the environmental impacts of macroeconomic policies, and especially to identify where unforeseen negative environmental effects may occur and design remedial measures. The framework is based on a formal mathematical model which shows the second-best nature of macroeconomic policies in the presence of environmental externalities. The model confirms the empirically observed and intuitively appealing conclusion that it is the combination of macroeconomic policies and subsidiary imperfections (policy, market or institutional), rather than macroeconomic policies alone, that leads to environmental degradation. Several illustrative examples are presented from case studies in selected developing countries.

International transfers to developing countries are sometimes advocated on the ground that they contribute to tropical forest conservation. Here we demonstrate that the effectiveness (and attractiveness) of this instrument is reduced if the restrictive assumption of deterministic prices is relaxed. With stochastic prices, the steady-state forest stock in the absence of transfers is greater, implying that the marginal benefit of additional hectares conserved is less. In addition, the ‘wealth effect’ of transfers counteracts the ‘freeing-up effect’, which implies that per unit of subsidy fewer hectares of tropical forest are protected. Both effects reduce the attractiveness of transfers as a policy instrument for Western governments to combat tropical deforestation.

The paper analyzes the conflict between illegal and legal exploitation of wildlife species in an East African context. In the model there are two agents, an agency managing a national park of fixed area and a group of local people living in the vicinity of the park. The park agency has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people hunt illegally. Because of the property rights, the park agency has incentives to invest in the stock of wildlife, while the behaviour of the local people is steered by short-term considerations. The model is analyzed in two steps. Firstly, the market solution is studied. Next, the model is examined when user and property rights are given to the local people.

To protect the elephant, trade in ivory has been banned since 1990. In this paper, we demonstrate that this ban's effect on elephant populations is ambiguous. Depending on the discount rate, among other things, the trade ban can either increase or decrease optimal population size. If the decision-maker's discount rate exceeds a certain threshold, the optimum stock of elephants is greater with a trade ban. Since the threshold is in the range of possible social discount rates, the success of the trade ban in promoting elephant conservation will vary spatially and temporally, depending on the characteristics and level of development of countries with significant elephant populations.

This paper models joint implementation (JI) for emission reduction between a developed and a developing country. When the per unit price of JI abatement is negotiated, the relative pay-offs deviate from the ratio of bargaining powers. When firms bargain, country-wise gains can increase with a greater abatement target. But if the governments bargain, the developing country's gains increase at the expense of the developed country as the target increases. However, the Pareto optimal JI can be achieved only when the governments negotiate over both abatement and transfer.

Since the beginning of the 1980s the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and International Monetary Fund) have introduced structural adjustment loans and stabilization programmes to correct balance-of-payments distortions and to realize the conditions necessary for economic growth in developing countries. In the course of the 1980s, the concept of sustainable development was launched which asked for a qualitatively different orientation of growth. This paper presents a summary of what has been learned with respect to the relationship between Bretton Woods intervention programmes and development. Adjustment programmes appear to have evolved through three different stages, with attention for environmental aspects of sustainable development emerging in the third stage. A sectoral analysis is presented of the possible environmental impacts of the various components of intervention programmes. Recommendations are made regarding possible improvements of WB and IMF adjustment strategies in the light of sustainable development, without fully translating them into actual changes at the level of specific programmes.

The paper reviews two alternative rules for allocation of property rights in a global greenhouse-gas emissions budget, assuming implementation of a tradablequota arrangement. These are the per capita rule and no-regrets-for-the-South (NRFTS) rule. The operation of a quota market under these alternative regimes is simulated on a spreadsheet, using 1990–1 data from 125 countries. A significant result is that once the South has secured a quota allocation based on the per capita principle, it stands collectively to lose from progress in abatement technology because of the strong link from technical progress to the world market price of quota. The more restricted NRFTS rule gives the South smaller gains from the quota system, but enables it to retain some of the rents from its own technical progress. Some implications for the South's position in future negotiations are noted.

This paper uses panel analyses to estimate relationships for agricultural planted area and beef cattle numbers at the state level in Mexico during the period 1970–85, in order to determine the main factors affecting forest land conversion. Of the key policy variables, maize and fertilizer prices appear to be the main influences on the expansion of planted area, whereas beef prices and credit disbursement influence cattle numbers. Population growth also affects both livestock and agricultural activities, and income per capita is positively correlated with cattle expansion. These estimated relationships are used to examine the effects both of agricultural and livestock sectoral policy changes and of trade liberalization in Mexico resulting from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). To avoid any unintended impacts of NAFTA on deforestation, it may be necessary for Mexico to make complementary investments in land improvements, especially for existing cultivation on rainfed land.

This paper provides an overview of recent research on the interconnections between environmental and trade policies. It describes how the assumptions of these models can be important to the conclusions derived on the gains from coordination. The Harrison–Rutherford–Wooton CGE model of the European Union is used to illustrate the importance of these issues. This model was extended to include three air pollutants and their health effects as non-separable influences on household preferences in each region described by the model. The results suggest that the conventional assumption of separability in preferences between marketed and non-marketed goods is central to conclusions about the importance of coordination of these policies.