This paper proposes a theoretical analysis of the joint impact of foreign aid and oil taxes on the revenues of a rich oil importing country (North) and a two-class, oil exporting country (South). Without coordination, oil taxes are strictly higher in the North and the global allocation of oil is inefficient. Moreover, oil taxes in the North extract some of the South's oil rents, undoing the revenue transfers from foreign aid. We show that a policy coordination mechanism reduces inefficiencies and improves global welfare.

Reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation (REDD) has been proposed as an economic and extensive source of emission abatement to supplement other long-term climate policies. However, critics suggest an excess supply of REDD credits may disrupt emerging carbon markets and raise north–south equity concerns. In this context, we investigate the economic implications of REDD regulations and future emissions reduction commitments. Numerical model simulations show that unrestricted exchange of REDD units reduces the international carbon price by half and cuts compliance costs by roughly one-third. Developed nations’ requirements for policy supplementarity, which restrict demand for REDD credits, reduce such price impacts but go at the expense of both economic efficiency and benefits to rainforest areas. Instead, unlimited REDD access facilitates climate policy targets to be tightened by almost a quarter at constant compliance cost, tripling the environmental ambition of the Kyoto Protocol and providing considerable wealth transfers to developing countries.

An energy-focused macro-micro approach is used to assess the poverty implications of government policy response to increases in international oil prices in South Africa. The first scenario assumes that increases in international oil prices are passed on to end users with no changes in government policy instruments. In this scenario, poverty indicators increase. The second scenario assumes that the world price increases are nullified by a price subsidy by the government. This scenario still leads to an increase in poverty as the beneficial price effect is cancelled out by a decline in households’ income induced by the financing method used. While revenue generated from a 50 per cent tax on windfall profit of the petroleum industry helps to minimize the loss in government revenue, it does not contribute to mitigating the increasing poverty trend, since the decline in saving and investment under this scenario restricts the country's growth, employment and income distribution perspectives.

We develop and apply a consistent and comprehensive theoretical framework for assessing whether economic growth is compatible with sustaining wellbeing over time. Our approach differs from earlier approaches by concentrating on wealth rather than income. Sustainability is demonstrated by showing that a properly defined comprehensive measure of wealth is maintained through time. Our wealth measure is unusually comprehensive, capturing not only reproducible and human capital but also natural capital, health improvements and technological change. We apply the framework to five countries: the United States, China, Brazil, India and Venezuela. We show that the often-neglected contributors to wealth – technological change, natural capital and health capital – fundamentally affect the conclusions one draws about whether given nations are achieving sustainability. Indeed, even countries that display sustainability differ considerably in the kinds of capital that contribute to it.

You have to admire the courage exhibited in going out on a limb like this, especially because the acrobats are sophisticated and understand how many chances to go wrong they have. Of course one can stand back and admire courage and dexterity without actually believing in the results, and without any feeling that one could do better.

The Arrow et al. paper is a welcome addition to a large literature on the linkage between asset values and social welfare. This literature has its roots in the concern about ‘greening’ the national accounts, but the paper shows how expanding the asset boundary beyond produced and natural goods could increase our measures of income, saving and wealth enormously. I will comment in turn on the wealth accounts, investment accounts and the treatment of CO2 emissions, using selected World Bank figures as a basis for comparison.

The world's leaders, business leaders and the public at large are beginning to question, amidst the multiple social, environmental and economic crises, whether our present trajectory of economic growth is sustainable. We seem to force ourselves to believe that we can grow ourselves out of the multiple crises we face today. The notion of sustainable development and the call for going beyond just material wealth to gauge our wellbeing has long featured in much of the sustainable development, environmental and ecological economics literature. We are afraid the present preoccupation with the green economy will not provide the change we are looking for if we don't address the fundamental problem of what we are aiming to achieve and how we measure our progress towards achieving those goals. We fall into the trap many international agencies have made over the past six decades, where the means become the ends and the ends become an academic exercise (Chang, 2001).

How sustainable is the growth pattern of a national economy? At first, answering this question seems almost impossible, since this would require knowing what happens and what can happen in the future. One needs to assess whether the investments we make today will be sufficient to provide future generations with the means to cope with imminent disasters like the exhaustion of minerals and vital resources, or other problems like increasing population pressure and climate change. One also needs to assess which combination of investment leads to the desired result. If entrepreneurs, managers and households already have problems in finding out what is the best mix of investment for them in their micro-environment, how can we answer the aggregate question that needs so much more information?

The Indian economy has grown rapidly at 6–8 per cent per year since 1995 and planners aim to sustain an 8 per cent growth rate in the next years. Growth has created considerable optimism about India and its place in the world. After many years of little change, poverty appears to be on the decline with an estimated 5–7 per cent reduction in the late 1990s (Sundaram and Tendulkar, 2003a, b, c; Deaton, 2005). Life expectancy increased from 59 years in 1991 to 64 years in 2008 and the primary school completion rate was at 96 per cent in 2008 (World Bank, 2012). Economic growth has resulted in a boom in the manufacturing and service sectors, large investments in infrastructure and energy projects, and a soaring middle class.