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Regulatory compliance in Lake Victoria fisheries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 November 2009

HÅKAN EGGERT  and
RAZACK B. LOKINA
HÅKAN EGGERT
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, SE-405 30, Göteborg, Sweden. Email: [email protected]
RAZACK B. LOKINA
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, Box 35045, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper analyzes the causes for regulatory compliance, using traditional deterrence variables and potential moral and social variables. We use self-reported data from 459 Tanzanian artisanal fishers in Lake Victoria. The results indicate that the decision to be either a non-violator or a violator, as well as the violation rate – if the latter – are influenced by changes in deterrence variables like the probability of detection and punishment and also by legitimacy and social variables. We also identify a small group of fishers who react neither to normative aspects nor to traditional deterrence variables but persistently violate the regulation.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 15 , Issue 2 , April 2010 , pp. 197 - 217
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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