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Problems of the commons: group behavior, cooperation and sanctioning in a two-harbor experiment

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 October 2012

Dmytro Zhosan  and
Roy Gardner
Dmytro Zhosan
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Ripon College, P.O. Box 248, Ripon, WI 54971, USA. Email: [email protected]
Roy Gardner
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, Indiana University, USA
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Abstract

This paper analyzes individual and group behavior in an experimental commons. Different factors that can help avoid the tragedy of the commons are studied in four experimental settings: separation of a larger commons into smaller commons (two harbors), knowledge/experience available to appropriators, communication within appropriator groups and the possibility of formal and informal sanctioning of group members. Subject populations include undergraduate students as well as professionals working in the Maine lobster and groundfish industries. This design enables a behavioral comparison between students and professionals, as well as a comparison between professionals in these two mutually exclusive fisheries. Results show that group size, communication, geographic separation and subjects' ability to solve the coordination game caused by this separation all contribute to appropriation efficiency on the commons.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 18 , Special Issue 1: Strategic behaviour and environmental commons , February 2013 , pp. 7 - 25
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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