Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 August 2016
This paper introduces a household model of private investment in storm protection under an endogenous risk framework to determine how defensive self-protection and self-insurance expenditures by coastal households to mitigate storm-inflicted damages are affected by the availability of public programs and the presence of a mangrove forest. The theoretical results show that publicly constructed physical barriers and mangroves encourage self-protection but discourage self-insurance expenditures. However, public disaster relief and rehabilitation programs lead to the crowding-out of self-protection but the crowding-in of self-insurance. Our empirical analysis of coastal households in Bangladesh impacted by Cyclone Sidr reveals partial support for the crowding-out and crowding-in effects of public investments and programs. Households located in a mangrove-protected area invest more in self-protection and less in self-insurance. Other controls, such as household socio-economic characteristics, also influence and add a degree of complexity to the relationship.