Published online by Cambridge University Press: 11 November 2021
This paper seeks to understand the link between resource governance and investor expectations in resource-rich countries. We test whether voluntary membership in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a public-private partnership that promotes transparency and accountability in the extractives sector, behaves as a credible signalling mechanism to investors that governments in resource-rich countries can manage resource revenue and adhere to sustainable fiscal policies in the medium and long run. Using an interrupted time series analysis coupled with a fixed effects model, we examine whether investor expectations on the price of sovereign debt behave as a credible signalling mechanism in the presence of certain conditions. Results indicate that in some cases there is a significant change in spread on the default price of sovereign debt as a result of announcement of either EITI candidacy or EITI compliance. However, it is clear that EITI membership alone is not a sufficient signal to investors that a country can effectively manage its resource revenues in the long run because the result of EITI implementation is heavily influenced by country-specific conditions.