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Strategic behaviour and environmental commons

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 January 2013

Ariel Dinar  and
Georges Zaccour
Ariel Dinar
Affiliation:
Water Science and Policy Center, Department of Environmental Sciences, University of California, Riverside, CA 92521, USA. E-mail: [email protected]
Georges Zaccour
Affiliation:
Game Theory and Management, GERAD, HEC Montréal, Canada. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

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Type
Introduction to the Special Issue
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 18 , Special Issue 1: Strategic behaviour and environmental commons , February 2013 , pp. 1 - 5
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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References

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