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The informational and signaling impacts of labels: experimental evidence from India on GM foods

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2013

Sangeeta Bansal ,
Sujoy Chakravarty  and
Bharat Ramaswami
Sangeeta Bansal
Affiliation:
Centre for International Trade & Development, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi 110067, India. Tel: +91-9810596578. E-mail: [email protected]
Sujoy Chakravarty
Affiliation:
Centre for Economic Studies and Planning, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India. E-mail: [email protected]
Bharat Ramaswami
Affiliation:
Planning Unit, Indian Statistical Institute, New Delhi, India. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

Much of the debate between the European and US positions about the labeling of genetically modified (GM) foods has been whether consumers perceive labels as a source of information or as a signal to change behavior. In this paper we provide an experimental framework for examining these roles of information and signaling. While previous studies have focused on the impact of labels on consumer behavior, our interest is also in what happens prior to the expression of aversion to GM-labeled foods. In particular, the experiment design allows the researcher to estimate a lower bound of the informational impact of labels on GM food aversion. The other novel feature of this paper is that, unlike earlier studies, it uses subjects from a developing country.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 18 , Issue 6 , December 2013 , pp. 701 - 722
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

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