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Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 February 2009

GORDON R. MUNRO
GORDON R. MUNRO*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics and Fisheries Centre, University of British Columbia, #997–1873 East Mall, Vancouver, B.C., CanadaV6T 1Z1. E-mail: [email protected]
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Abstract

This paper is not concerned with advances in game theory. Rather, the paper is concerned with the relevance, if any, of game theory to a major resource management issue, namely the management of internationally shared fishery resources. It is argued that the economics of the management of such resources cannot, in fact, be understood, other than through the lens of game theory. The paper discusses several elementary game theory concepts that are of utmost policy relevance, but which are, as of yet, poorly understood by most policy makers. The paper does, in addition, discuss a key policy problem in the management of shared fishery resources that demands a game-theoretic analysis. The required analysis, however, has yet to be developed.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 14 , Issue 1: GAME THEORY, NATURAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT , February 2009 , pp. 7 - 27
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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