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Efficiency, enforcement and revenue tradeoffs in participatory forest management: an example from Tanzania

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 August 2011

Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson  and
Razack B. Lokina
Elizabeth J. Z. Robinson
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Box 640, 405 30 Gothenburg, Sweden; Environment for Development Tanzania, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania; and International Food Policy Research Institute, Ghana. Email: [email protected]
Razack B. Lokina
Affiliation:
Environment for Development Tanzania, Department of Economics, University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Where joint forest management has been introduced into Tanzania, ‘volunteer’ patrollers take responsibility for enforcing restrictions over the harvesting of forest resources, often receiving as an incentive a share of the collected fine revenue. Using an optimal enforcement model, we explore how that share, and whether villagers have alternative sources of forest products, determines the effort patrollers put into enforcement and whether they choose to take a bribe rather than honestly reporting the illegal collection of forest resources. Without funds for paying and monitoring patrollers, policy makers face tradeoffs over illegal extraction, forest protection and revenue generation through fine collection.

Type
Research Article
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 17 , Issue 1 , February 2012 , pp. 1 - 20
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2011

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