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Bioprospecting and biodiversity contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 June 2003

Denise M. Mulholland  and
Elizabeth A. Wilman
Denise M. Mulholland
Affiliation:
Office of Policy, Planning and Evaluation, US Environmental Protection Agency, Department of Economics, University of Calgary.
Elizabeth A. Wilman
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Calgary, Calgary, Alberta, T2N1N4, Canada. Tel: 403 220 6108. Fax: 403 282 5262. E-mail [email protected]
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Abstract

A dynamic economic model for a biodiversity prospecting contract, between a host country and a pharmaceutical company, is developed and used to explain the structure of existing contracts. The host country's stocks of biodiversity and genetic information are crucial inputs to the production of high-quality samples. Even with compete property rights contracts will be second best; it is not possible to perfectly monitor host-country inputs to the drug discovery process. Contracts vary due to the different degrees of observability of host-country inputs, and incomplete or ineffective property rights.

Type
Theory and Applications
Information
Environment and Development Economics , Volume 8 , Issue 3 , July 2003 , pp. 417 - 435
Copyright
© 2003 Cambridge University Press

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