Consider a transitive value ordering of outcomes and lotteries on outcomes, which satisfies substitutivity of equivalents and obeys “continuity for easy cases,” i.e., allows compensating risks of small losses by chances of small improvements. Temkin (2001) has argued that such an ordering must also – rather counter-intuitively – allow chances of small improvements to compensate risks of huge losses. In this paper, we show that Temkin's argument is flawed but that a better proof is possible. However, it is more difficult to determine what conclusions should be drawn from this result. Contrary to what Temkin suggests, substitutivity of equivalents is a notoriously controversial principle. But even in the absence of substitutivity, the counter-intuitive conclusion is derivable from a strengthened version of continuity for easy cases. The best move, therefore, might be to question the latter principle, even in its original simple version: as we argue, continuity for easy cases gives rise to a sorites.

Prioritarianism is the view that we ought to give priority to benefiting those who are worse off. Sufficientism, on the other hand, is the view that we ought to give priority to benefiting those who are not sufficiently well off. This paper concerns the relative merits of these two views; in particular, it examines an argument advanced by Roger Crisp to the effect that sufficientism is the superior of the two. My aim is to show that Crisp's argument is unsound. While I concede his objections against the particular prioritarian views that he considers, I propose a different version of prioritarianism that is invulnerable to those objections.

Social thinkers frequently remind us that people differ in their views on what constitutes personal well-being, but that even when they don't differ, they disagree over the extent to which one person's well-being can be permitted to be traded off against another's. In this paper I show, by offering an account of the development of development economics, that in professional debates on social policy, economists speak or write as though they agree on values but differ on their reading of facts. A number of ethicists have concluded from this near-exclusive interest in facts that modern economics must be an ethical desert. It is shown here that the reason research economists analyze facts rather than values is that modern economics is built on broad ethical foundations, capable of being reduced as special cases to the various ethical theories that are currently on offer. Ethics has taken a back seat in modern economics not because contemporary economists are wedded to a “value-free” enterprise, but because the ethical foundations of the subject were constructed over five decades ago and are now regarded to be a settled matter.

This paper provides further evidence to the argument that Smith' theory of justice did not follow the natural justice school and that subsequently the ethical position on acquiring private property is not independent of the effects which such acquisition may have on the property-less individuals. I will show that the justification for private ownership is based on “reasonable expectations” which owners of assets have with regard to the fruits of the asset. The expectation to subsist through the use of one's natural assets is equally reasonable. This is not to say that Smith believed that society should equally distribute income. But it does mean that the acquisition of private property must not interfere with the rights of individuals to subsist. Consequently, distribution is clearly an important part of Smith's conception of justice.

Motivation, agency, and public policy: of knights and knaves, pawns and queens, by Julian Le Grand, Oxford University Press, 2003, 230 pages.

Julian Le Grand offers an account of public policy that arranges views along two axes: a motivational axis, along which individuals can be knights or knaves, and an agency axis, along which they can be pawns or queens. Knaves are concerned to further their self-interest, understood broadly in terms of whatever people may care about. Following Hume, Le Grand calls such characters “knaves,” but this has no automatic connotations with illegal activities. Knights, on the other hand, are motivated to help others for no private reward, even to the detriment of their interests. Pawns, like the pieces on the chess board, are passive victims of circumstances, unable to make responsible choices. Queens do make such choices: they are empowered agents responsible for their fates.

Mathias Risse has provided a thoughtful critique of my book, raising serious points about a major part of the argument. I am glad to have the opportunity to reflect further on it.

Fabienne Peter and Hans Bernhard Schmid

Introduction to the Symposium on Rationality and Commitment

The abstract of the paper by Hans Bernhard Schmid, Beyond Self-Goal Choice on page 51 was erroneously placed on the Introduction page as well.

The publisher would like to apologise to the authors and their readers for this error.