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Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

David Sobel
David Sobel
Affiliation:
Bowling Green State University
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Extract

An adequate moral theory must take (at least) each person into account in some way. Some think that the appropriate way to take an agent into account morally involves a consequentialist form of promoting something about her. Others suggest instead that morality requires a Kantian form of respecting something about an agent. I am interested here in pursuing the former line. When we pursue the broadly consequentialist line we come to this question: what should we promote on the agent's behalf when we are taking her into account morally?

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 14 , Issue 2 , October 1998 , pp. 249 - 281
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1998

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