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THE VEIL OF IGNORANCE VIOLATES PRIORITY*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2008

Juan D. Moreno-Ternero  and
John E. Roemer
Juan D. Moreno-Ternero
Affiliation:
Universidad de Málaga and CORE, Université catholique de Louvain
John E. Roemer
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Abstract

The veil of ignorance has been used often as a tool for recommending what justice requires with respect to the distribution of wealth. We complete Harsanyi's model of the veil of ignorance by appending information permitting objective comparisons among persons. In order to do so, we introduce the concept of objective empathy. We show that the veil-of-ignorance conception of John Harsanyi, so completed, and Ronald Dworkin's, when modelled formally, recommend wealth allocations in conflict with the prominently espoused view that priority should be given to the less able in wealth allocation. We finally argue that the veil of ignorance should be rejected as a tool for discovering what justice requires.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 24 , Issue 2 , July 2008 , pp. 233 - 257
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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