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Rights, Indirect Utilitarianism, and Contractarianism

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Alan P. Hamlin
Alan P. Hamlin
Affiliation:
The University, Southampton, England
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Extract

Economic approaches to both social evaluation and decision-making are typically Paretian or utilitarian in nature and so display commitments to both welfarism and consequentialism. The contrast between the economic approach and any rights-based social philosophy has spawned a large literature that may be divided into two branches. The first is concerned with the compatibility of rights and utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) seen as independent moral forces (e.g., the debate on the possibility of a Paretian liberal). This branch of the literature may be characterized as an example of the broader debate between the teleological and deontological approaches. The second is concerned with the possibility that substantial rights may be grounded in utilitarianism (or Pare-tianism) with the moral force of rights being derived from more basic commitments to welfarism and consequentialism. This branch of the literature may be characterized as an exploration of the flexibility of the teleological approach, and, in particular, its ability to give rise to views more normally associated with the deontological approach. This essay is concerned with the second branch of the literature.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 5 , Issue 2 , October 1989 , pp. 167 - 188
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1989

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