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Rationality: A Third Dimension

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Frederic Schick
Frederic Schick
Affiliation:
Rutgers University
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Extract

I want in this paper to do two things. First, I want to respond to some studies that argue that people are often not rational: that people regularly and systematically depart from rationality. The conclusion itself does not worry me. I pressed for the same in a recent book (Schick, 1984). But the arguments seem to me wrong, and wrong in an interesting way. There may be something to be learned from seeing how and why they fail.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 3 , Issue 1 , April 1987 , pp. 49 - 66
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1987

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References

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