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THE PRIORITY VIEW

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 December 2016

David McCarthy
David McCarthy*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Hong Kong, Pokfulam, Hong Kong. Email: [email protected] URL: http://philosophy.hku.hk/?n=Main.StaffDM
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Abstract:

According to the priority view, or prioritarianism, it matters more to benefit people the worse off they are. But how exactly should the priority view be defined? This article argues for a highly general characterization which essentially involves risk, but makes no use of evaluative measurements or the expected utility axioms. A representation theorem is provided, and when further assumptions are added, common accounts of the priority view are recovered. A defence of the key idea behind the priority view, the priority principle, is provided. But it is argued that the priority view fails on both ethical and conceptual grounds.

Keywords

Priority viewprioritarianismegalitarianismutilitarianismdistribution
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 215 - 257
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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