Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-t7czq Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-26T06:07:59.806Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

PREFERENCES VS. DESIRES: DEBATING THE FUNDAMENTAL STRUCTURE OF CONATIVE STATES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 May 2015

Armin W. Schulz
Armin W. Schulz*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Kansas 3083 Wescoe Hall, Lawrence, KS 66045, USA. Email: [email protected]; URL: http://people.ku.edu/~a382s825/
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

I address an overlooked question about the structure of the cognitive/conative model of the mind that underlies much of the work in economics, psychology and philosophy: namely, whether conative states are fundamentally monistic (desire-like) or comparative (preference-like). I argue that two seemingly promising sets of theoretical considerations – namely, the structure of Rational Choice Theory, and considerations of computational efficiency – are unable to resolve this debate. Given this, I suggest that a consideration that speaks in favour of the preference-based view is the fact that it makes it easier to explain certain empirically observed patterns in decision making.

Keywords

decision theorypreferencesdesirestransitivityutility
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 2 , July 2015 , pp. 239 - 257
Check for updates
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Allais, M. 1953. Le comportement de l’homme rationnel devant le risque: critique des postulats et axiomes de l’école Américaine. Econometrica 21: 503–546.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bermudez, J. 2009. Decision Theory and Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bradley, R. and List, C.. 2009. Desire as belief revisited. Analysis 69: 31–37.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Bratman, M. 1987. Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1991. Weighing Goods. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 1999. Ethics out of Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Busemeyer, J. and Townsend, J.. 1992. Fundamental derivations from decision field theory. Mathematical Social Sciences 23: 255–282.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Carruthers, P. 2006. The Architecture of the Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Clark, A. 1997. Being There. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Cox, J. and Epstein, S.. 1989. Preference reversals without the independence axiom. American Economic Review 79: 408–426.Google Scholar
Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes’ Error. New York, NY: Grosset/Putnam.Google ScholarPubMed
Davidson, D. 1963. Actions, reasons, and causes. In Essays on Actions and Events, 3–20. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Davidson, D. 1969. How is weakness of the will possible? In his Essays on Actions and Events, 21–42. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Eells, E. 1982. Rational Decision and Causality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Fodor, J. 1981. RePresentations. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G. and Selten, R., eds. 2001. Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P. and the ABC Research Group. 1999. Simple Heuristics that Make Us Smart. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Glimcher, P., Dorris, M. and Bayer, H.. 2005. Physiological utility theory and the neuroeconomics of choice. Games and Economic Behavior 52: 213–256.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Goldman, A. 1970. A Theory of Human Action. Princeton, NJ: Prentice-Hall.Google Scholar
Goldman, A. 2006. Simulating Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Grether, D. and Plott, C.. 1979. Economic theory of choice and the preference reversal phenomenon. American Economic Review 69: 623–638.Google Scholar
Guala, F. 2005. The Methodology of Experimental Economics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hagen, E., Chater, N., Gallistel, C., Houston, A., Kacelnik, A., Kalenscher, T., Nettle, D., Oppenheimer, D. and Stephens, D.. 2012. Decision making: what can evolution do for us? In Evolution and the Mechanisms of Decision Making, ed. Hammerstein, P. and Stevens, J., 97–126. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, D. 1995. The impossibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. Mind 104: 473–490.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hausman, D. 2012. Preference, Value, Choice, and Welfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Houston, A., McNamarra, J. and Steer, M.. 2007. Violations of transitivity under fitness maximization. Biology Letters 3: 365–367.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Jeffrey, R. 1983. The Logic of Choice. Second Edition. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Google Scholar
Jeffrey, R. 1992. Probability and the Art of Judgment. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Johnson, J. and Busemeyer, J.. 2005. A dynamic, stochastic, computational model of preference reversal phenomena. Psychological Review 112: 841–861.CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Joyce, J. 1999. The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A.. 1979. Prospect theory. Econometrica 47: 263–291.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kalenscher, T., Tobler, P., Huijbers, W., Daselaar, S. and Pennartz, C.. 2010. Neural signatures of intransitive preferences. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 4: 1–14.Google ScholarPubMed
Lewis, D. 1988. Desire as belief. Mind 97: 323–332.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1996. Desire as belief II. Mind 105: 303–313.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loomes, G., Starmer, C. and Sugden, R.. 1991. Observing violations of transitivity by experimental methods. Econometrica 59: 425–439.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Loomes, G. and Sugden, R.. 1982. Regret theory: an alternative theory of rational choice under uncertainty. Economic Journal 92: 805–824.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Luce, R. D. and Raiffa, H.. 1957. Games and Decisions: Introduction and Critical Survey. New York, NY: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Morillo, C. 1990. The reward event and motivation. Journal of Philosophy 87: 169–186.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Nichols, S. and Stich, S.. 2003. Mindreading. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pollock, J. 2006. Thinking about Acting. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Reed, E. 1996. Encountering the World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Rieskamp, J., Busemeyer, J. and Mellers, B. A.. 2006. Extending the bounds of rationality: evidence and theories of preferential choice. Journal of Economic Literature 44: 631–661.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosenberg, A. 2012. Philosophy of Social Science. Fourth Edition. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.Google Scholar
Ross, D. 2005. Economic Theory and Cognitive Science: Microexplanation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Savage, L. 1954. The Foundations of Statistics. New York, NY: John Wiley.Google Scholar
Schroeder, T. 2004. Three Faces of Desire. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schroeder, T. 2009. Desire. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2009 Edition), ed. Zalta, E. N.. URL: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2009/entries/desire/.Google Scholar
Schroeder, T. 2010. Desire and pleasure in John Pollock's “Thinking in Acting”. Philosophical Studies 148: 447–454.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Simon, H. 1957. Models of Bounded Rationality. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Smith, M. 1987. The Humean theory of motivation. Mind 96: 36–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sopher, B. and Gigliotti, G.. 1993. Intransitive cycles: rational choice or random error? Theory and Decision 35: 311–336.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Stampe, D. 1986. Defining desire. In The Ways of Desire, ed. Marks, J., 149–174. Chicago, IL: Precedent Publishing.Google Scholar
Sterelny, K. 2003. Thought in a Hostile World. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Tsai, R.-C. and Bockenholt, U.. 2006. Modeling intransitive preferences: a random-effects approach. Journal of Mathematical Psychology 50: 1–14.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
van Gelder, T. 1996. Dynamics and cognition. In Mind Design II, ed. Haugeland, J., 421–450. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Waite, T. 2001. Intransitive preferences in hoarding gray jays (Perisoreus canadensis). Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology 50: 116–121.CrossRefGoogle Scholar