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A Political and Economic Case for the Democratic Enterprise

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 October 2009

Samuel Bowles  and
Herbert Gintis
Samuel Bowles
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
Herbert Gintis
Affiliation:
University of Massachusetts, Amherst
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Extract

We consider two reasons why firms should be owned and run democratically by their workers. The first concerns accountability: Because the employment relationship involves the exercise of power, its governance should on democratic grounds be accountable to those most directly affected. The second concerns efficiency: The democratic firm uses a lower level of inputs per unit of output than the analogous capitalist firm.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 9 , Issue 1 , April 1993 , pp. 75 - 100
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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