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Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality, Koons Robert. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, xii + 174 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  15 October 2009

Gian Aldo Antonelli
Gian Aldo Antonelli
Affiliation:
Yale University
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Type
Reviews
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 9 , Issue 2 , October 1993 , pp. 305 - 313
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1993

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References

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