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Law as a Public Good: The Economics of Anarchy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Tyler Cowen
Tyler Cowen
Affiliation:
George Mason University
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Extract

Various writers in the Western liberal and libertarian tradition have challenged the argument that enforcement of law and protection of property rights are public goods that must be provided by governments. Many of these writers argue explicitly for the provision of law enforcement services through private market relations.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , October 1992 , pp. 249 - 267
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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