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Laboratory Experimentation in Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Alvin E. Roth
Affiliation:
University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

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Type
Review Essay
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1986

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References

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