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THE IMPOSSIBILITY OF A PARETIAN REPUBLICAN? SOME COMMENTS ON PETTIT AND SEN

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 May 2004

Christian List
Affiliation:
London School of Economics

Abstract

Philip Pettit (2001) has suggested that there are parallels between his republican account of freedom and Amartya Sen's (1970) account of freedom as decisive preference. In this paper, I discuss these parallels from a social-choice-theoretic perspective. I sketch a formalization of republican freedom and argue that republican freedom is formally very similar to freedom as defined in Sen's “minimal liberalism” condition. In consequence, the republican account of freedom is vulnerable to a version of Sen's liberal paradox, an inconsistency between universal domain, freedom, and the weak Pareto principle. I argue that some standard escape routes from the liberal paradox – those via domain restriction – are not easily available to the republican. I suggest that republicans need to take seriously the challenge of the impossibility of a Paretian republican.

Type
Essay
Copyright
© 2004 Cambridge University Press

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