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How to Avoid the Paretian-Libertarian Paradox

A Reply to Kelly

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Jonathan Pressler
Jonathan Pressler
Affiliation:
Carnegie-Mellon University
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Type
Discussions
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 4 , Issue 2 , October 1988 , pp. 326 - 332
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1988

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References

REFERENCES

Basu, Kaushik. 1984. “The Right to Give Up Rights.” Economica 51:413–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gibbard, Allan. 1974. “A Pareto-Consistent Libertarian Claim.” Journal of Economic Theory 7:388–410.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kelly, Jerry S. 1988. “Rights and Social Choice: Comment.” Economics and Philosophy 4:316–325.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pressler, Jonathan. 1987. “Rights and Social Choice: Is There a Paretian Libertarian Paradox?” Economics and Philosophy 3:1–22.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, Amartya. 1970. “The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.” Journal of Political Economy 78:152–57.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sen, Amartya 1982. “Liberty, Unanimity and Rights.” In Choice, Welfare and Measurement, pp. 291–326. Cambridge: MIT Press.Google Scholar