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EQUAL OPPORTUNITY, REWARD AND RESPECT FOR PREFERENCES: REPLY TO ROEMER

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 August 2012

Marc Fleurbaey
Marc Fleurbaey*
Affiliation:
Princeton University, [email protected]
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Abstract

This rejoinder to Roemer (this issue) examines Roemer's amendment to his EOp criterion, explains the similarities and differences between Roemer's approach to equality of opportunity and the economic literature inspired by the fair allocation theory, and proposes some clarifications on the compensation principle and the role of the reward principle in the definition of a responsibility-sensitive social criterion. It highlights the power of the ideal of respect for individual preferences with respect to the reward issue and the concern for potential harshness of the social criterion toward the individuals who fail to make good use of their opportunities. It discusses Roemer's objection against holding individuals responsible for their preferences.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 28 , Issue 2: Formal Ethics , July 2012 , pp. 201 - 216
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2012

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References

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