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The Economic Thought of Karl Polanyi: Lives and Livelihood, J. R. Stanfield. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1986, x + 162 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Andrew Rutten
Andrew Rutten
Affiliation:
Cornell University
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 6 , Issue 1 , April 1990 , pp. 157 - 164
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1990

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References

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