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Do economists make markets? On the performativity of economics, edited by Donald MacKenzie, Fabian Muniesa, and Lucia Siu. Princeton University Press, 2007, 371 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Matthias Klaes*
Affiliation:
Keele University

Abstract

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Type
Reviews
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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