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Deontology and Economics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

John Broome
John Broome
Affiliation:
University of Bristol
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Extract

In The Moral Dimension (Etzioni, 1988), Amitai Etzioni claims, as did Albert Hirschman in Morality and the Social Sciences (Hirschman, 1980), that people often act from moral motives, that economics needs to recognize this, and that it will be significantly changed by doing so. I agree, though I think the changes may be smaller than Etzioni believes – I shall be explaining why. But Etzioni goes further. He makes a specific claim about the sort of morality that motivates people: it is deontological. In this paper, I shall examine what this means, how far it is true, and what difference it makes.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 8 , Issue 2 , October 1992 , pp. 269 - 282
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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References

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