Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-23T20:14:41.252Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDGMENT AGGREGATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Frank Hindriks
Frank Hindriks*
Affiliation:
University of Groningen
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

Paradoxical results concerning judgment aggregation have recently been invoked to defend the thesis that a corporate agent can be morally responsible for a decision without any of its individual members bearing such responsibility. I contend that the arguments offered for this irreducibility thesis are inconclusive. They do not pay enough attention to how we evaluate individual moral responsibility, in particular not to the role that a flawed assessment of the normative reasons that bear on the issue to be decided on play in this context. I go on to propose a method for distributing corporate responsibility to individual members within the judgment aggregation framework.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 161 - 177
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Bovens, L. and Rabinowicz, W. 2006. Democratic answers to complex questions – an epistemic perspective. Synthese 150: 131–53.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Copp, D. 2007. The collective moral autonomy thesis. Journal of Social Philosophy 38: 369–88.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dancy, J. 2000. Practical Reality. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Dietrich, F. and List, C. 2007a. Judgment aggregation by quota rules. Journal of Theoretical Politics 19: 391–424.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Dietrich, F. and List, C. 2007b. Strategy-proof judgment aggregation. Economics and Philosophy 23: 269–300.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
French, P. 1984. Collective and Corporate Responsibility. New York: Columbia University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Kornhauser, L. A. and Sager, L. G. 1993. The one and the many: adjudication in collegial courts. California Law Review 81: 1–59.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, C. 2006. The discursive dilemma and public reason. Ethics 116: 362–402.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
List, C. 2009, forthcoming. Judgment aggregation: a short introduction. In Handbook of the Philosophy of Economics, ed. Mäki, U.. Amsterdam: Elsevier.Google Scholar
Nottelmann, N. 2007. Blameworthy Belief. A Study in Epistemic Deontologism. Dordrecht: Springer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Orend, B. 2005. War. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005 Edition), ed. Zalta, E. N.. URL: <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/war/>..>Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 2001. A Theory of Freedom. From the Psychology to the Politics of Agency. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 2003. Groups with minds of their own. In Socializing Metaphysics. The Nature of Social Reality, ed. Schmitt, F. F., 167–94. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.Google Scholar
Pettit, P. 2007. Responsibility incorporated.Ethics 117: 171–201.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rosen, G. 2003. Culpability and ignorance. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103: 61–84.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scanlon, T. M. 1998. What We Owe to Each Other. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Smith, M. 1994. The Moral Problem. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Wallace, R. J. 1994. Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Wolf, S. 1990. Freedom Within Reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar