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COLLECTIVE OBLIGATIONS, GROUP PLANS AND INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  23 November 2016

Allard Tamminga  and
Hein Duijf
Allard Tamminga
Affiliation:
University of Groningen, Oude Boteringestraat 52, 9712 GL Groningen, the Netherlands and Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13, 3512 BL Utrecht, the Netherlands. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.rug.nl/staff/a.m.tamminga/.
Hein Duijf
Affiliation:
Utrecht University, Janskerkhof 13, 3512 BL Utrecht, the Netherlands. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.uu.nl/staff/hwaduijf/.
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Abstract:

If group members aim to fulfil a collective obligation, they must act in such a way that the composition of their individual actions amounts to a group action that fulfils the collective obligation. We study a strong sense of joint action in which the members of a group design and then publicly adopt a group plan that coordinates the individual actions of the group members. We characterize the conditions under which a group plan successfully coordinates the group members’ individual actions, and study how the public adoption of a plan changes the context in which individual agents make a decision about what to do.

Keywords

collective obligationteam reasoningcollective intentionalitycooperationjoint action
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 33 , Issue 2 , July 2017 , pp. 187 - 214
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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