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What is the economic concept of choice? An experimental philosophy study

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 February 2019

Michiru Nagatsu Open the ORCID record for Michiru Nagatsu [Opens in a new window]  and
Kaire Põder
Michiru Nagatsu*
Affiliation:
Practical Philosophy, Faculty of Social Sciences and Helsinki Institute of Sustainability Science (HELSUS), University of Helsinki, Finland
Kaire Põder
Affiliation:
Estonian Business School, Department of Economics and Finance, Tallinn, Estonia
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Economists and philosophers disagree about the concept of choice used in economics. Some behavioural economists argue that economic models of choice will improve as they become more and more psychologically realistic. Don Ross argues that this argument fails because its hidden assumption – that the economic concept of choice is the same as the psychological counterpart – is false. Ross conjectures that the economic concept of choice concerns a population-scale pattern of behavioural changes in response to incentives. We conduct a survey experiment to test two predictions that Ross’s conjecture generates. The statistical analysis of our data confirms our predictions, although with some qualifications. In interpreting our results, we distinguish two versions of commonsensible realism, strong and weak, and propose the weak one as a plausible explanation of our results. Weak commonsensible realism also produces further testable hypotheses. Some methodological implications of our study are discussed.

Keywords

Commonsensible realismconceptual variancechoice concepteconomics and psychologyexperimental philosophy of science
Type
Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , November 2019 , pp. 461 - 478
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Copyright
© Cambridge University Press 2019 

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