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VALUE NEUTRALITY AND THE RANKING OF OPPORTUNITY SETS

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 July 2015

Michael Garnett
Michael Garnett*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX, UK. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.bbk.ac.uk/philosophy/our-staff/academics/garnett.
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Abstract:

I argue that a liberal commitment to value neutrality is best honoured by maintaining a pure cardinality component in our rankings of opportunity sets. Two challenges to this claim are considered. The first holds that cardinality rankings are unnecessary for neutrality, since what matters from this perspective is the variety (and not the mere size) of opportunity sets. The second holds that pure cardinality metrics are insufficient for neutrality, because opportunities cannot be individuated into countable entities without presupposing some relevantly partisan evaluative perspective. In each case, a clear understanding of the liberal basis for valuing liberty yields a satisfying response.

Keywords

Freedomlibertyopportunityliberalismneutrality
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 99 - 119
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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