Hostname: page-component-745bb68f8f-v2bm5 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2025-01-10T04:58:12.388Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

UTILITARIANISM AND PRIORITARIANISM II

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 March 2008

David McCarthy
David McCarthy*
Affiliation:
University of Edinburgh
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract

The priority view has become very popular in moral philosophy, but there is a serious question about how it should be formalized. The most natural formalization leads to ex post prioritarianism, which results from adding expected utility theory to the main ideas of the priority view. But ex post prioritarianism entails a claim which is too implausible for it to be a serious competitor to utilitarianism. In fact, ex post prioritarianism was probably never a genuine alternative to utilitarianism in the first place. By contrast, ex ante prioritarianism is defensible. But its motivation is very different from the usual rationales offered for the priority view. Given the untenability of ex post prioritarianism, it is more natural for most friends of the priority view to revert to utilitarianism.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 24 , Issue 1 , March 2008 , pp. 1 - 33
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Aczél, J. 1966. Lectures on functional equations and their applications. New York: Academic Press.Google Scholar
Broome, J. Basingstoke: 1989. What's the good of equality? In Current Issues in Microeconomics, ed. Hey, J. D.. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 236–262.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Broome, J. 1991. Weighing goods. Oxford: Blackwell.Google Scholar
Broome, J. 2004. Weighing lives. New York: Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Diamond, P. 1967. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility: comment. Journal of Political Economy 75: 765–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hammond, P. 1991. Interpersonal comparisons of utility: why and how they are and should be made. In Interpersonal comparisons of weil-being, eds. Elster, J. and Roemer, J.. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 200–54.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hardy, G. H., Littlewood, J. and Polyà, G. 1934. Inequalities. London: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1955. Cardinal welfare, individualistic ethics, and interpersonal comparisons of utility. Journal of Political Economy 63: 309–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1975. Nonlinear social welfare functions: do welfare economists have a special exemption from Bayesian rationality? Theory and Decision 6: 311–32.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Harsanyi, J. 1977. Nonlinear social welfare functions: a rejoinder to Professor Sen. In Foundational problems in the special sciences, eds. Butts, R. and Hintikka, J.. Dordrecht: Reidel, 293–296.Google Scholar
Hurley, S. 1989. Natural reasons. New York: Oxford University Press.Google Scholar
Jensen, K. K. 1995. Measuring the size of a benefit and its moral weight. Theoria 61: 25–60.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. 1968. Counterpart theory and quantified modal logic. Journal of Philosophy 65: 113–26.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCarthy, D. 2006. Utilitarianism and prioritarianism I. Economics and Philosophy 22: 335–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCarthy, D. 2007. Measuring life's goodness. Philosophical Books 48: 303–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
McCarthy, D. (ms). Distributive equality.Google Scholar
Parfit, D. 2000. Equality or priority? In The ideal of equality, eds. Clayton, M. and Williams, A.. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 347–86.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W. 2001. Prioritarianism and uncertainty: on the interpersonal addition theorem and the priority view. In Exploring practical philosophy: from action to values. eds. Egonsson, D., Josefsson, J., Petersson, B. and Rφnnow-Rasmussen, T.. Aldershot: Ashgate.Google Scholar
Rabinowicz, W. 2002. Prioritarianism for prospects. Utilitas 14: 2–21.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rawls, J. 1971. A theory of justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Risse, M. 2002. Harsanyi's ‘utilitarian theorem’ and utilitarianism. Noûs 36: 550–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Scheffler, S. 1982. The rejection of consequentialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.Google Scholar
Tungodden, B. 2003. The value of equality. Economics and Philosophy 19: 1–44.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Wakker, P. 1989. Additive representations of preferences. Dordrecht: Kluwer.CrossRefGoogle Scholar