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REJOINDER: THE “AMBIGUITY AVERSION LITERATURE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT”

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 November 2009

Nabil I. Al-Najjar  and
Jonathan Weinstein
Nabil I. Al-Najjar
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
Jonathan Weinstein
Affiliation:
Northwestern University
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Extract

The pioneering contributions of Bewley, Gilboa and Schmeidler highlighted important weaknesses in the foundations of economics and game theory. The Bayesian methodology on which these fields are based does not answer such basic questions as what makes beliefs reasonable, or how agents should form beliefs and expectations. Providing the initial impetus for debating these issues is a contribution that will have the lasting value it deserves.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 3: Economics and Philosophy on Ambiguity Aversion , November 2009 , pp. 357 - 369
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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