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ON MUTUAL BENEFIT AND SACRIFICE: A COMMENT ON BRUNI AND SUGDEN'S ‘FRATERNITY’

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 July 2009

Benedetto Gui
Benedetto Gui*
Affiliation:
University of Padova
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Abstract

This note comments on Bruni and Sugden's interesting notion of fraternity among contract partners as joint commitment to cooperate for mutual benefit. I raise two points on their paper, both concerning the role of sacrifice. First I maintain that, differently from other social preferences, guilt aversion (or warm glow) does not imply self-sacrifice. Secondly, I argue that aiming for mutual benefit does not prevent individuals from facing trade-offs between their own and their partners’ surplus, so the notion of sacrifice cannot be entirely eschewed. To the contrary, reciprocal ‘sacrifices’ enhance cooperative intentions and help create feelings of friendliness.

Type
Discussion
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 25 , Issue 2 , July 2009 , pp. 179 - 185
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2009

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References

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