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The Logic of Rational Play in Games of Perfect Information

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Giacomo Bonanno
Giacomo Bonanno
Affiliation:
University of California, Davis
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Extract

For the past 20 years or so the literature on noncooperative games has been centered on the search for an equilibrium concept that expresses the notion of rational behavior in interactive situations. A basic tenet in this literature is that if a “rational solution” exists, it must be a Nash equilibrium. The consensus view, however, is that not all Nash equilibria can be accepted as rational solutions. Consider, for example, the game of Figure 1.

Type
Essays
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 7 , Issue 1 , April 1991 , pp. 37 - 65
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1991

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