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A LIBERAL EGALITARIAN PARADOX*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  11 December 2006

ALEXANDER W. CAPPELEN  and
BERTIL TUNGODDEN
ALEXANDER W. CAPPELEN
Affiliation:
The University of Oslo and the Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration, Bergen, Norway.
BERTIL TUNGODDEN
Affiliation:
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway.
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Abstract

A liberal egalitarian theory of justice seeks to combine the values of equality, personal freedom, and personal responsibility. It is considered a much more promising position than strict egalitarianism, because it supposedly provides a fairness argument for inequalities reflecting differences in choice. However, we show that it is inherently difficult to fulfill this ambition. We present a liberal egalitarian paradox which shows that there does not exist any robust reward system that satisfies a minimal egalitarian and a minimal liberal requirement. Moreover, we demonstrate how libertarianism may be justified in this framework if we drop the egalitarian condition.

Type
Essay
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 22 , Issue 3 , November 2006 , pp. 393 - 408
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2006

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Footnotes

*

We thank Geir Asheim, Peter Vallentyne, and two anonymous referees for extremely valuable comments on the paper. The usual disclaimer applies.

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