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INCENTIVE INEQUALITIES AND FREEDOM OF OCCUPATIONAL CHOICE

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2015

Douglas Mackay
Douglas Mackay*
Affiliation:
Department of Public Policy, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. Abernethy Hall 217, CB 3435, 131 S. Columbia St., Chapel Hill, NC 27599, USA. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://dmackay.web.unc.edu
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Abstract:

In Rescuing Justice and Equality, G.A. Cohen argues that the incentive inequalities permitted by John Rawls's difference principle are unjust since people cannot justify them to their fellow citizens. I argue that citizens of a Rawlsian society can justify their acceptance of a wide range of incentive inequalities to their fellow citizens. They can do so because they possess the right to freedom of occupational choice, and are permitted – as a matter of justice – to exercise this right by making occupational decisions on the basis of a wide range of values and preferences.

Keywords

incentivesdifference principleG.A. CohenJohn Rawlsequality
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 21 - 49
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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