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HOW TO PLAY GAMES? NASH VERSUS BERGE BEHAVIOUR RULES

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  19 February 2015

Pierre Courtois ,
Rabia Nessah  and
Tarik Tazdaït
Pierre Courtois
Affiliation:
INRA, UMR 1135 LAMETA, 2 place Viala, F-34000 Montpellier, France. Email: [email protected]. URL: https://sites.google.com/site/pmccourtois/.
Rabia Nessah
Affiliation:
IESEG, School of Management, UMR 8179 LEM, 3 rue de la Digue, F-59000 Lille, France. Email: [email protected]
Tarik Tazdaït
Affiliation:
CNRS, EHESS, Ecole des Ponts ParisTech, UMR 8568 CIRED, 45 bis avenue de la Belle Gabrielle, F-94000 Nogent sur Marne, France. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

Assuming that in order to best achieve their goal, individuals adapt their behaviour to the game situation, this paper examines the appropriateness of the Berge behaviour rule and equilibrium as a complement to Nash. We define a Berge equilibrium and explain what it means to play in this fashion. We analyse the rationale of individuals playing in a situational manner, and establish an operational approach that describes the circumstances under which the same individual might play in one fashion versus another.

Keywords

Berge equilibriumMoral principlesMutual supportSituational decision making
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 31 , Issue 1 , March 2015 , pp. 123 - 139
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 

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