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Decision theory and the rationality of further deliberation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 April 2003

Igor Douven
Igor Douven
Affiliation:
Erasmus University Rotterdam
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Abstract

Bayesian decision theory operates under the fiction that in any decision-making situation the agent is simply given the options from which he is to choose. It thereby sets aside some characteristics of the decision-making situation that are pre-analytically of vital concern to the verdict on the agent's eventual decision. In this paper it is shown that and how these characteristics can be accommodated within a still recognizably Bayesian account of rational agency.

Type
Research Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 18 , Issue 2 , October 2002 , pp. 303 - 328
Copyright
© 2002 Cambridge University Press

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