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Cooperation and Contracts

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 December 2008

Frederic Schick
Affiliation:
Rutgers University

Extract

In a conflict between two people, one person wants one thing and the other wants something else and they think they can't both have what they want. Suppose that what they want can only be the outcome of some joint action. Adam must do either y or z and Eve either y' or z' – here y-and-y' would be one joint action, y-and-z' would be another, and so on. Adam wants the outcome of his doing z while Eve is doing y'. Eve wants the outcome of her doing z' while Adam is doing y. Each thinks that these outcomes can't both be had.

Type
Essays
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 1992

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