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COMPETITION AS AN AMBIGUOUS DISCOVERY PROCEDURE: A REAPPRAISAL OF F. A. HAYEK'S EPISTEMIC MARKET LIBERALISM

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  03 April 2013

Ulrich Witt
Ulrich Witt*
Affiliation:
Max Planck Institute of Economics, [email protected]
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Abstract

Epistemic arguments play a significant role in the foundations of market liberalism as exemplified, in particular, by the work of F. A. Hayek. Competition in free markets is claimed to be the most effective device both to utilize the knowledge dispersed throughout society as well as create new knowledge through innovation competition. The fast pace with which new economic opportunities are discovered and costs are reduced is considered proof of the benefits of free markets to the common good. However, with its inherently unpredictable consequences, innovation competition is actually ambiguous in this respect. This feature raises questions over the stringency of market liberal pleas that oppose quests for redistribution and environmental concerns in an absolute fashion.

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Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 29 , Issue 1 , March 2013 , pp. 121 - 138
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013

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