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Being Realistic about Reasons, T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press, 2014, vii +132 pages.

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Being Realistic about Reasons, T. M. Scanlon. Oxford University Press, 2014, vii +132 pages.

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2015

James Lenman
James Lenman*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, 45 Victoria Street, Sheffield S6 Sheffield S3 7QB. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.jimmylenman.com/.
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Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 143 - 149
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Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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References

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