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ATHLETIC POLICY, PASSIVE WELL-BEING: DEFENDING FREEDOM IN THE CAPABILITY APPROACH

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  16 July 2015

Jessica Begon
Jessica Begon*
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, Victoria Street, Sheffield, S3 7QB, UK. Email: [email protected]. URL: http://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/profiles/begon
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Abstract:

G.A. Cohen has criticized the capability approach for focusing on individuals’ freedom – their capability to control their lives – and ignoring benefits achieved passively. He argues that this view of well-being is excessively ‘athletic’. However, if the capability approach is employed to guide egalitarian public policy, capabilities are the appropriate goal of just distributive policies, not just components of individual well-being. When understood as a policy-guide, I argue that the capability approach's focus on ‘athletic’ individual freedom and control is justified: in the public domain, it is important not just that individuals receive benefits, but that they participate in their achievement.

Keywords

Well-beingpublic policyfreedomcapability approachdistributive justice
Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 32 , Issue 1 , March 2016 , pp. 51 - 73
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Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 

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