Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-gb8f7 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-20T09:17:34.539Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

ASSET INEQUALITY, ECONOMIC VULNERABILITY AND RELATIONAL EXPLOITATION

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 June 2018

Gilbert L. Skillman
Gilbert L. Skillman*
Affiliation:
Wesleyan University, Middletown, CT 06459, USA. URL: http://www.wesleyan.edu. Email: [email protected]
Get access Rights & Permissions [Opens in a new window]

Abstract:

In response to Roemer's reformulation of the Marxian concept of exploitation in terms of comparative wealth distributions (1982, 1996), Vrousalis (2013) treats economic exploitation as an explicitly relational phenomenon in which one party takes advantage of the other's economic vulnerability in order to extract a net benefit. This paper offers a critical assessment of Vrousalis's account, prompting a revised formulation that is analysed in the context of a matching and bargaining model. This analysis yields precise representations of Vrousalis's conditions of economic vulnerability and economic exploitation and facilitates comparison to the alternative conceptions of Marx and Roemer.

Keywords

inequalityexploitationbargaining
Type
Symposium Article
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 34 , Special Issue 3: Exploitation , November 2018 , pp. 343 - 368
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

REFERENCES

Binmore, K. 2007. Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.Google Scholar
Binmore, K., Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A.. 1986. The Nash bargaining solution in economic modelling. Rand Journal of Economics 17: 176–188.Google Scholar
Binmore, K., Shaked, A. and Sutton, J.. 1989. An outside option experiment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 753–770.Google Scholar
Gale, D. 1987. Limit theorems for markets with sequential bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 43: 20–54.Google Scholar
Harrison, G., Lau, M. and Williams, M.. 2002. Estimating individual discount rates in Denmark: a field experiment. American Economic Review 92: 1606–1617.Google Scholar
Lawrance, E. 1991. Poverty and the rate of time preference: evidence from panel data. Journal of Political Economy 99: 54–77.Google Scholar
Marx, K. 1990 [1867]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume I. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Marx, K. 1991 [1894]. Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. Volume III. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. 1982. A General Theory of Exploitation and Class. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. 1986. Value, Exploitation and Class. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.Google Scholar
Roemer, J. 1996. Egalitarian Perspectives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, A. 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50: 97–109.Google Scholar
Rubinstein, A. and Wolinsky, A.. 1985. Equilibrium in a market with sequential bargaining. Econometrica 53: 1133–1150.Google Scholar
Samwick, A. 1998. Discount rate heterogeneity and social security reform. Journal of Development Economics 57: 117–146.Google Scholar
Scaramozzino, P. 1991. Bargaining with outside options: wages and employment in UK manufacturing. Economic Journal 101: 331–342.Google Scholar
Skillman, G. 2016. Wealth inequality and economic power: a sequential bargaining analysis. Metroeconomica 67: 291–312.Google Scholar
Vrousalis, N. 2013. Exploitation, vulnerability, and social domination. Philosophy and Public Affairs 41: 131–157.Google Scholar