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AN INTRODUCTION TO ALLAN GIBBARD’S HARVARD SEMINAR PAPER

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  04 July 2014

John A. Weymark
John A. Weymark*
Affiliation:
Vanderbilt University, [email protected]
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Abstract

This note provides an introduction to the accompanying article by Allan Gibbard that was originally written for the 1968–69 Harvard graduate seminar conducted by Kenneth Arrow, John Rawls and Amartya Sen.

Type
Articles
Information
Economics & Philosophy , Volume 30 , Issue 3 , November 2014 , pp. 263 - 268
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2014 

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References

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